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Abstract  
Against the backdrop of an increasing demand for efficient, effective, and sustainable 
infrastructure this chapter uses data from two rapid railway transportation projects, the 
Gautrain in South Africa and the Addis Ababa City Light Rail Transit (AA-LRT) System in 
Ethiopia, to explore how capital-intensive infrastructure is delivered in Africa despite the 
many bottlenecks in the environment. Adopting a comparative approach, we illustrate how 
the two “megaprojects” were organized to deliver on the intended objectives and how they 
dealt with complex interfaces with the surrounding contexts. In each case, we evaluate how 
the project was sponsored and organized, the institutions surrounding the project, and whether 
there was a trade-off between project efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability Specifically, 
we find that project governance is directly influenced by the political and socio-cultural 
environment surrounding the megaproject. Therefore, we argue that project organization to 
deliver large infrastructure in Africa is not a one-size-fits-all solution. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
There is abundant literature on large infrastructure projects delivery in either Africa or 
other developing countries. Some scholars argue for a centralized approach to project 
promotion and governance, while others argue for a decentralized approach (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006). However, adopting and relying on such prescriptive approach is 
promotion of normative and mimetic isomorphism (Biesenthal et al., 2018) where such 
prescriptions of either centralized or decentralized governance is used as a regulatory device. 
In this chapter we argue that such normative and mimetic isomorphism does not reflect how 
infrastructure delivery is taking place in Africa, and indeed is something that Africa, 
especially Sub-Saharan Africa cannot afford. 
The infrastructure gap between the Sub-Saharan Africa when compared to other 
developing countries is large. Bogetic and Fedderke (2005) found that the density of 
transportation networks in terms of population, land, trip time in urban areas and the rail lines 
in terms of land, was consistently lower in comparison to middle income countries. Equally, 
the World bank (2010) notes that Africa has inefficient regional links and a limited household 
access. In Africa, the price of services such as power, water, road transport, phones, or 
internet, is much higher with the tariffs paid being many times over those paid in developing 
countries (World Bank, 2010). Therefore, closing the infrastructure gap is of critical 
importance to Africa especially the Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore imperative that 
organizational means should be devised to develop effective ways to deliver the much-needed 
infrastructure in Africa and close the identified infrastructure gap.  
However, infrastructure delivery to meet the intended goal is usually affected by many 
factors including the institutional arrangements in the environment like regulation, contract 
enforcement mechanisms, independent judiciary, and the extent to which efficient markets 
exist. It is well known that the way institutional factors such as regulation, affect project 
organization is just as important as the technical factors that drive the project if not more, and 
that project’s performance depend on it (Biesenthal et al., 2018). Indeed it is not in dispute 
that there is a connection between institutional arrangement and project performance (Miller 
and Hobbs, 2005). It is also not in dispute that certain organizational structures adopted for 
certain projects affect the outcome and project performance. However, there is little literature 
on why certain project organization arrangements are adopted and how they are able in turn 
to enable the envisaged project performance. 
 In this study we illustrate how the Gautrain in South Africa and the Addis Ababa City 
Light Rail Transit (AA-LRT) System in Ethiopia were organized to deliver on the intended 
project objectives and how they dealt with institutional complexities faced by large 
infrastructure projects in Africa. Data was collected through interviews and triangulated 
against a review of documents comprising project reports, power point presentations, and 
articles published in local media, online information and review reports by various interested 
parties.  In each case study we evaluate how the rail project was sponsored and organized, the 
institutional framework and whether there was a trade-off between the OECD’s criteria of 
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability (Austrian Development Cooperation, 2009). We 
find that project sponsorship and governance is directly influenced by the political and socio-
cultural environment surrounding the infrastructural project. Consequently, we argue that in 
large infrastructure projects delivery in Africa, there is no one-size-fits-all organizational 
solution.  
We organize this chapter as follows. We will first discuss the rationale for infrastructure 
and bottlenecks to infrastructure development. Then through a comparative analysis of the 
two case studies, we illustrate the nature of project organizations that were adopted and how 
they were formed through the lens of institutional theory. We conclude by discussing how 
complex project’s environment interfaces were managed and the project performance.  
1.1 Background and rationale for the AA-LRT and Gautrain Rail Projects 
African cities will experience pressure associated with urbanization for decades to come 
(Stren, 2014). The growing demand on urban infrastructure, particularly urban public 
transport infrastructure systems, means that the railway infrastructure in Africa and other 
developing countries is needed and should receive an increased consideration (African 
Development Bank (AfDB), 2015). Indeed, one of the reasons why African countries are seen 
to be not as competitive as their counterparts in other developing countries is because of poor 
infrastructure (AfDB, 2013a; Moghalu, 2014; World Bank, 2017). Therefore, the 
development of the Gautrain in South Africa and the AA-LRT in Ethiopia are both most 
welcome interventions and responses to the urban problem of transportation in Africa. The 
Gautrain was planned to meet future transport demands anticipated because of economic and 
population growth (GMA, 2011). Equally, the construction of the LRT was a response to the 
mounting public transport challenges of metropolitan Addis Ababa (Sabatino, 2017; United 
Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat), 2017). 
However, infrastructure development needs careful planning, organization, 
implementation and management for it to be effective, efficient, and sustainable. Similarly, 
the goals for developing infrastructure should be clear, well defined and not only driven by 
factors such as political sublime (Flyvberg 2014). There are also system bottlenecks and 
governance challenges, which affect infrastructure delivery. We know that projects may fail 
to survive the many bottlenecks or risk compromising the outcome if they are not adequately 
planned, organized, implemented and only driven by the political sublime (Allport et al., 
2008; Othman, 2013). Extant literature suggests a number of bottlenecks in infrastructure 
delivery experienced in sub-Saharan Africa including:  
 Financing – Capital for infrastructure can be hard to acquire because governments 
lack the resources and lenders may not be convinced that the projects are value for 
money (AfDB, 2013b; DOT South Africa, 2017).  
 Central government as promoter - The role of the central government in infrastructure 
projects is a contentious one. Some argue that the central government should not 
assume an active role in project development but should rather be concerned with 
policy formulation and auditing of public interest objectives to be met by the 
megaprojects (Williams and Samset, 2010). However, other authors contend that 
projects fail due to a complete lack of or inadequate central government’s support. 
Allport et al. (2008) posit that good transportation projects require institutional, 
professional and political support for them to meet their objectives.  
 Land – Many mega infrastructure projects involve land acquisition, displacement of 
homes and businesses and acquiring rights of way. Land plays a crucial role in 
transport infrastructure development if it must be delivered in a timely and cost-
effective manner (PWC, 2014). Many projects have been delayed or even abandoned 
due to failures in adequately dealing with land issues such as in Uganda (ESI Africa, 
2017). 
 Public buy-in - Strong public resistance has frequently been cited as reason for project 
failures (Han et al., 2009). It is critical that a project should achieve legitimacy 
otherwise it risks becoming a target of opposition. In view of the risk associated with 
public acceptance such as with e-toll roads in Gauteng (South Africa’s Supreme Court 
of Appeal, 2013), promoters and/or developers, which would most likely involve the 
government, should pro-actively seek to gain public acceptance and support for the 
project (Naidoo, 2013; PWC, 2014).  
 Good and effective planning - Project success depends on effective planning 
processes which should forecast many years ahead and address considerable 
uncertainty (Allport et al., 2008). Effective planning also assures funding and 
countries who ensure that planning is done correctly, continue to successfully build 
the strategic infrastructure they need (OECD, 2011).  
 Procurement method - Increasingly more infrastructure especially for transportation 
in the world is being delivered through public private partnerships (PPP) and 
implemented in phases. Historically, the delivery of new infrastructure has been the 
sole responsibility of governments but now with the ever-widening gap between needs 
and the budgets to implement infrastructural projects, PPP’s have become the most 
preferred model of financing infrastructure (OECD, 2012; Wentworth and Makokera, 
2015; Asian Development Bank, 2016). 
 Allocation of risk - Improper allocation of commercial and technological risks result 
in disputes and ultimately in project failures. Han et al (2009) identified conflicts 
between organizations due to problems rooted in asymmetrical risk allocation as one 
of the major causes of delays in mega projects including railway networks. 
 Transport mode integration - Integrating transport systems means that the issues of 
“competition” and “complementarity” with other transport modes has to be addressed 
if at all a rail project has to be successful. A successful urban public transport system 
is one that should offer convenience to the public by integrating one mode with the 
other modes so that the public is more willing to switch from private to public transport 
(PWC, 2014).  
 Governance - The feasibility of large projects such as railway systems, depend on 
plans for the operation and management of the infrastructure. Problems to do with 
viability have been related to issues to do with the railway operator and the contract 
(Winch, 2013). A lot of attention must therefore equally be placed on the post 
commissioning of the infrastructure and the contract arrangements that should be in 
place. 
The fact that the two cases at the heart of this study, namely the Gautrain and the AA-
LRT rapid rail are both operational, suggests that their project governance system managed 
to effectively deal with the factors or bottlenecks aforementioned. Before we turn to discuss 
our methods and examine our data, however, we first briefly review what we know about the 
way institutions in the surrounding context impact the governance of megaprojects 
1.2 Megaproject Governance and Institutional Environment 
Large infrastructure projects have been described to be socio-technical undertakings 
embedded in institutional frameworks (Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Biesenthal et al, 2018).  
Hence   the adoption and retention of many organizational practices are often dependent on 
social pressures for conformity and legitimacy than technical or economic pressures. It has 
also been argued, that although there is a lot of emphasis on the technical aspect of project 
delivery, the institutional work actually precedes the technical management aspect in large 
projects (Biesenthal et al., 2005; Dille and Soderhund, 2011; Chi et al, 2014). The need to pay 
more attention to the institutional aspect is that the technical and economic inputs and outputs 
hardly ever define the design of the project organizations except in functional terms 
(Biesenthal et al., 2005). To the contrary, project organizations are defined by their social 
construction, by those who fund, those who contest them, and those who use them (Biesenthal 
et al., ibid.). 
In sum, managing of large projects should not just be thought of in terms of technical and 
economic issues, rather large infrastructure projects should be viewed in terms of their 
technical component, the strategic and institutional component (Morris and Geraldi, 2011). 
At the institutional level, the extent to which the surrounding context supports the project 
organization is a major factor to determine if the project can or not perform effectively. 
Consequently, paying attention to the interdependence between the project organization and 
the environment can further aid our understanding of project success and long-term 
performance. As Biesenthal et al (2018) said, understanding the institutional framing and 
logics of mega projects can provide the key to successful delivery of infrastructural solutions.  
2.0 RESEARCH METHODS 
In this chapter, we draw lessons from two case studies on what it took to deliver the light rail 
transport system in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia and the Gautrain high-speed 
train in the Gauteng province of South Africa. From these two mega projects we document 
the best practices and outcomes that made these two capital intensive investments in transport 
infrastructure successful despite the many bottlenecks. Our study adopted a qualitative 
approach with regards to data collection. The sources of information included project 
documents, and articles published in local media and on online platforms. Other sources 
included responses from interviews with key informants and information publicly available 
on the operators’ websites.  
For the Gautrain project, the Interviews were conducted with five executive managers in 
different departments of the Gautrain Management Agency (GMA). Specifically, we 
interviewed informants at the Transport Integration and Planning unit; Technical Services; 
Operations and Performance; Assets and Maintenance Assurance as well as Portfolio 
Management. The participants were selected because of their managerial capacity and virtue 
of being involved in the Gautrain project from inception. 
For the Addis Abba project the interviews were conducted with informants from Addis 
Ababa and a researcher who was involved in the project. 
In both cases, we analyzed the obtained information around three areas of interest: project 
organization, project delivery, and performance of the operating asset. Apart from obtaining 
information through interviews and project document analysis, we also used online 
newspapers, commentaries and reviews as sources of information. Specifically, we used 
Gautrain, Gauteng, AA-LRT, Addis Ababa, rapid rail transport in Africa, and transportation 
infrastructure as key words in internet search engines such as google, google scholar, refseek 
and academic index. 
3.0 ANALYSIS 
3.1 The Gautrain rapid rail 
 
The Gautrain is Africa’s first rapid rail system and is located in the Gauteng province of 
South Africa (Gautrain Management Agency (GMA), 2014). The Gautrain is widely 
perceived as symbol of pride for Gauteng and South Africa as a whole. The Gautrain is a 
strategic initiative of the Gauteng Provincial Government planned to meet future transport 
demands anticipated because of economic and population growth (GMA, 2011; Thomas, 
2013). The Gautrain was born from the need to address the increasing traffic congestion 
problem in Gauteng. Gauteng, which is the country’s economic hub, is characterised by traffic 
congestion on most of its major routes that connect its three metropolitan municipalities of 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Ekurhuleni. Connections between these three metros are mostly 
road based. In addition, there is generally a car culture where people mostly commute with 
their cars to work.  
Consequently, the Gautrain was developed to change the way people travelled, to ease 
traffic congestion, as well as to advance the goal of creating a smart metropolitan area based 
on mixed land uses and development corridors. In addition, the Gautrain project was meant 
to promote rejuvenation of central Johannesburg and Pretoria (GMA, 2011). According to the 
Gauteng’s 25-year Integrated Transport Master Plan designed to improve urban public 
transport systems within the province, the Gautrain was planned to be the backbone of all 
public transit in the province. Consequently, it was envisaged that the Gautrain would promote 
mobility and accessibility, redirection of urban growth, contained urban growth, resource 
based economic development and rural development beyond the urban edge.  
The initial planning and pre-feasibility investigations were undertaken for the Gautrain 
Rapid Rail Link project in 1997/1998. Driven by these initial studies, the local government 
decided to develop a rapid rail system based on the North-South spine between Tshwane and 
Johannesburg, and an East-West spine between OR Tambo International Airport and Sandton 
(GMA, 2011). The Gautrain network has two major corridors: the North -South and the East 
–West. The East -West route, which was Phase 1 of the project, starts from Sandton station 
via Marlboro, to Rhodesfield station in Kempton Park and then connects at the OR Tambo 
International Airport (GMA, 2011). The North-South route, Phase 2, starts from Park station 
precinct in central Johannesburg and proceeds north underground for six kilometres beneath 
the Parktown ridge to Hatfield. The 80-kilometre rail system links Johannesburg, Tshwane 
and OR Tambo International Airport. Station locations were evaluated in terms of a set of 
criteria such as existing land use and residential density, current and future growth potential, 
environmental acceptability, accessibility and road capacities.  
A couple of years after the publication of the initial studies, in February 2000 the Premier 
of Gauteng announced the project as one of the strategic economic infrastructure development 
initiatives of the provincial government. The project was a means of promoting long-term 
sustainable socio-economic growth (GMA, 2015). The foresight, steadfastness and 
commitment of the Gauteng provincial government, amid criticisms from some politicians, 
academics, media and affected residents, made the project a reality. Responding to criticism 
from the parliamentary transport portfolio committee in 2005, the then Gauteng’s premier, 
Mbazima Shilowa argued: 
"Nothing has changed. The train is being built to ease congestion, stimulate economic 
activity and create jobs. That was our plan in 2000 and it still is. We are expecting financial 
closure in December and the sod-turning ceremony has been planned for January" 
Criticism and opposition came from all quarters and about just anything that could be 
thought of. The project was criticised for its impact on the environment, its ridership estimate 
was questioned, and the train was labelled the ‘train for the rich”. Some communities such as 
Dunkeld in Johannesburg contested the alignment in their suburb and others opted for legal 
action. This was the case for the Muckleneuk/Lukasrand property owners and residents 
association (MLPORA) (Case No. 28192/04, 2004). Commenting on how the opposition and 
criticism of the project was overcome, the Executive Manager Reputation, at GMA in an 
interview with News24 (Online, 2008), attributed the success of the project to the political 
support from the provincial government. Another factor that seems to have contributed to 
make the project a reality was the focus and clarity on the purpose. One respondent said:   
 “..the system was built for people that already have cars, with the intention of moving them 
from using their cars to public transport and thus decongesting the roads…” 
To make the project a reality, the local government needed to eliminate the financial 
bottleneck. To this purpose, the Gautrain project was initiated by the Gauteng Provincial 
Government as a public private partnership (PPP) owing to the unproven nature of a high-
speed rail link project, being the first of its kind in South Africa and Africa for that matter. 
Optimistic timelines and a high level of technical complexity were sources of concern and 
trepidation among politicians, academics and the public who opposed the project. But several 
economic appraisals undertaken prior to the development revealed that the Gautrain had the 
potential to considerably contribute to socio-economic development, efficient land use, and 
reduction in congestion and air pollution in cities, by reducing the number of vehicles plying 
the roads. A review of GMA project documentation show that the project had the potential to: 
 Save vehicle kms per day; 
 Lower traffic congestion, which would in turn result in travel cost savings of all 
vehicles in Gauteng of 3c per km; 
 Save costs associated with accidents of about R475 million per annum; 
 Save R3, 845 million per year in vehicle operating costs by the year 2030 (2003 
values);   
 Save R7,114 million per year in time costs for passengers travelling in the corridor by 
2030 (2003 Rand values) (GMA, 2011); 
 Contribute about one percent to the Gross Geographic Product of Gauteng but have 
approximately 74% of its impact in the Gautrain Province itself. 
From the point of view of long-term growth, the Gautrain complied with the minimum 
economic efficiency and effectiveness criteria. This was important to undercut strong 
opposition in the environment 
 Governance, Delivery and Performance 
The Gautrain project was championed and given priority by the Provincial Government 
to take off and attempt to prove pessimists wrong. Being the primary promoter of the project, 
the Gauteng Provincial Government had the Gautrain project as a main priority to contribute 
to the advancement of socio-economic objectives in the province and to the national economy. 
The priority accorded to the project, the commensurate level of championing right from the 
beginning, as well as quick decision-making processes and approach to risk management 
ensured that the Gautrain project was efficient and sustainable. As one respondent said:  
“.. if it was not for the provincial involvement, the project may not even have proceeded 
to where it ended up. So, in other words, because of the vested interest that they had in making 
sure that this thing happened, they made it a priority; it was not a national government 
priority. It would have ended up down the line, behind other things on the national plan, and 
therefore because of that provincial focus, the project happened. Therefore, to make it happen 
on the higher level, political will was on the provincial level, the lobbying and getting the 
necessary funds and guarantees and so on, all of that happened on the provincial level and 
that made the project possible.” 
The local provincial government spear headed and promoted the project. The provincial 
government, which is a local regional government, was determined to see the project through 
because they wanted to address the problem of congestion in the province, stimulate economic 
activity and also, they saw the project as a way to create jobs; one respondent observed: 
“This project belongs with the Department of Gauteng Roads and Transport; therefore, 
they have the provincial focus when they look at this project. If I have to take this project and 
go to the national government, PRASA (National rail authority) would say, I’ve got all these 
projects that I have to look at. Therefore, the focus might have been more diluted from the 
government’s side.” 
 “I would say it is successful because there is a political will for it to 
succeed….provincially, I cannot compare it with any other national initiative” 
The public private partnership (PPP) model was adopted to procure the project. The 
decision to develop as a PPP was informed by the fact that the project was unaffordable to the 
Gauteng Province on its own. According to the Gautrain COO, even at the National level, 
there was very little fiscal space to finance infrastructure by the state at the time as it had 
already spent R235 billion (in 2010 terms) on infrastructure in all spheres of government. He 
noted that much of the R235 billion was borrowed money with explicitly guaranteed terms. 
Similarly, the State-Owned Entities (SOE) had also borrowed about R100 billion to finance 
their projects. Consequently, the idea of adopting a PPP became more attractive. 
Unsurprisingly, the project faced contract management challenges both to agree on a 
governance model for project delivery and a governance model for operations. Initially, a 
Province Support Team (PST) consisting of engineers and other specialist consultants steered 
Gautrain during the planning and feasibility phase before the concession agreement was 
signed. The PST was retained during the development stage as contract managers. The team 
was responsible for managing the design and construction review process as well as the 
construction, legal and environmental compliance processes. An independent certifier was 
appointed to check procurement and economic elements. Noteworthy, socio-economic 
development obligations were part of the concession agreement.  
Before we move to analyze the project delivery, it is worth examining however the 
contractual structure governing the operations, which was designed at inception and was 
instrumental to find a partner for the delivery stage. Figure 1 below illustrates the contractual 
structure during operations which the state used to go to the market to find a private partner 
to deliver and operate the project. 
 
Figure 1: Gautrain Contractual structure (Source: GMA, 2016) 
As figure 1 shows, a private entity was appointed to deliver the project on a design, build 
and operate basis.  In turn, the province government (GMA) was made contractually 
responsible to provide requisite skills to oversee and manage the project during the operational 
period and beyond. The GMA was tasked with ensuring that the private partner (so-called 
concessionaire) maintains and looks after the asset till March 2026, after which the full 
ownership of the asset will be returned to the Gauteng Province. A penalty system is attached 
to the monthly performance measurement, whereby if the concessionaire falls short in respect 
of any of the performance measures, their payment is reduced for that month. In turn now to 
examine the project delivery stage in more detail. 
 Delivery 
Two key elements were highlighted by respondents as being critical to the success of the 
project during its delivery stage. These are the management of risks and the model that was 
adopted to finance the project delivery stage. Managing risks was governed by the contract 
agreements that were formulated. Financial risks were related to the bankability of the project, 
which was important to ensure private sector competition in the tender process and interest to 
construct, operate and maintain the rail transport system. These include mainly escalation and 
currency risks, changes in employment rates, and country taxes.  
Yet the greatest financial risk was the potential ridership, especially since viability of the 
project partially depended on a dedicated feeder and distribution system. In addition, the 
project was the first public transport initiative which relied on the diversion of commuters 
from private car use to rail system in South Africa and was therefore viewed by the Province 
as “highly uncertain” in terms of usage and revenue. Consequently, a patronage guarantee, to 
cover the costs in case of shortfalls in demand at a particular time, was determined by the 
Province as a tool to ease the burden of costs on both the province and the concessionaire. 
The Patronage guarantee was based on the premise of affordability as viewed by the Province, 
that is, the capital contribution and the guarantee it would have to make during the operational 
period. In order not to be disadvantaged, the Provincial Government determined to select the 
bidder with the lowest cost combination of Provincial contribution and patronage guarantee 
on a net present value basis. 
The state claims that the granting of the concession agreement to the (concessionaire best able 
to manage the project technical, operational and financial risks and then run the railways 
contributed to the success of the Gautrain project (GMA, 2015). Furthermore, the state claims, 
it put significant effort in drafting the contract with the concessionaire; one respondent said: 
“….I think that the fact that we got a very tight concession agreement with all those 
schedules that go with it is probably where the strength lies, all around. Because it is a 
contractual arrangement, there’s no scope for letting things go…” 
The drafting of the contracts was informed by the planning and specifications from the 
client that preceded it. As one respondent observed: 
“The conceptual design kicked off in 2005 looking at how the operational systems were 
going to look like and how we would measure performance as well as passenger predictions. 
Before the concession contract was signed, there was a provincial requirement that said we 
want a system that can do the following, so two different sides were shortlisted as potential 
suppliers. They then submitted proposals based on specifications…. There were output 
specifications in terms of what we want, for instance, a train that can run from the Airport to 
Sandton in 15 minutes…We did not say, ‘this is how the trains should look like’ …they then 
had to go and say okay to get that we have to do this…so the whole design specs in terms of 
what happens on the track level, what happens on the trains, the nose, speed profile, they had 
to come up with and say, ‘I propose this rolling stock; it is available in the market and can 
comply and give you what you want…..The performance requirements also were 
considered…how you do it, what materials you use to get it there, what management systems 
you need to keep it there, and the type of technology, were not specified, but the input 
specifications were focused on the output side.” 
 Financing 
The financial model for the Gautrain project formed another critical component of the 
project delivery. According to the GMA, two models were developed, one to demonstrate 
viability (the provincial model) and the other to capture and manage the contractual 
relationship (base case financial model). The first, the province’s financial model, determined 
the minimum required total revenue (MRTR) required to operate and maintain the system 
including corporate tax, loan stock servicing, debt servicing, overheads, operator’s fee, 
renewals and maintenance.  The second model was developed, by the Concessionaire and its 
advisors, to capture the contractual relationship, including the operating costs and revenues 
during the concession period.  This model, the Base Case Financial Model was based on 
contractually committed fixed costs as influenced by economic variables such as inflation, 
interest and foreign exchange rates. Project reports show that the base case financial model 
was necessary because the concessionaire owned the financial solution proposed in the first 
model, which is inclusive of costs and revenue assumptions. The base case model was meant 
to be dynamic as key inputs were expected to vary during the concession agreement period.  
The two models can be thought of as Complementary.  The Province’s Financial Model 
demonstrated viability viz-a-viz affordability, value for money and risk transfer. On the other 
hand, the Base Case Model captured and managed the contractual relationship. This model 
appeared to be a good approach to risk management as both models considered sensitivities 
to varying scenarios. In all, the Gautrain project accessed five sources of finance including 
National grant from the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA) (44.2%), Provincial Grant from the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) (26.1%), Provincial borrowing (18.4%), 
private sector borrowing (9.5%) and private sector equity (1.8%). Commenting on the 
influence of the financing model on the Gautrain project, interviewees intimated that the 
project, just as any other initiative of this magnitude required the approval and capital input 
of the national government. One respondent stated: 
 “A project of this nature will not survive without political support at all levels. The 
project is within the Department of Roads and Transport so strictly speaking we report to the 
provincial legislature…the funding for Gautrain actually comes from the National Treasury 
so there is a point where there must be involvement at the national level. … the source of 
funding is the same…provincial government gets the money from the national 
government…In terms of Gautrain project, the ridership is because of the availability and the 
reliability of the system but before we even get there, for you to be able to even get to a point 
of funding and approval of this nature, you need the support of all levels of government” 
From the funding mix, the provincial government committed more money at 44.5% 
(Provincial grant - 26.1% and Provincial borrowing- 18.4%) to the project. The central 
Government through Division of Revenue Act (South Africa) contributed 44.2%. Essentially, 
the public sector contributed 88.7% to the project. The private funding amounted to 11.3% 
(private sector borrowing and equity).  
 Land and community issues 
To tackle the challenge of land acquisition, the Gautrain counted on the central 
government’s support. In addition, Bombela and Gauteng Provincial Government, set up a 
stakeholder relationship and communication structure with the GMA and media releases, to 
update and interact with all affected communities, public relevant authorities and affected 
third parties. Whilst we lack details how the compulsory land acquisition process unfold, this 
task was assigned to the provincial government. It was also the government who became 
responsible to pay fair compensation according to the terms of the law.  
The Gautrain route affected directly over 1100 properties. According to Andrew and 
Thoms (2012) who were Civil Director and CEO for Bombela respectively, Provincial 
Government was completely responsible for expropriation of the required land in a timely 
manner as well as for acquiring land-use rights, including payment of compensation to owners 
all in compliance to the law. In view of the time constraints and the complications associated 
to land acquisition in a country that is founded on constitutional democracy, Andrew and 
Thom document that land acquisition was planned in tranches so that it could match 
construction access requirements. However, delivery of land timeously proved problematic 
resulting in court cases in some instances such as one by the Dunkeld community. The land 
problems brought by communities impacted on the programme, design and construction 
sequences. Notwithstanding the land challenges, GMA (2015) claims that all court cases were 
settled and where compensation was needed to be made, it was done. They also claim that 
contractual implications were managed fairly in response to the impact of the land acquisition 
challenges. 
 Performance of the Project Outcome  
The Gautrain project began operations in 2010. Different reports, some of which by 
independent consultants, suggest that since 2010, the Gautrain has managed to change the 
perception about public transit in Gauteng and South Africa. The Gautrain appears to be a 
symbol of success and as envisaged, Gautrain has managed to reduce to some extent, the 
traffic congestions. The reports show that Gautrain passenger numbers have increased since 
inception. For example, KPMG reports that in 2015 the Gautrain transported 60 000 
passengers per day and 77% of these passengers, own cars. Likewise reports by the GMA 
indicate that in January 2012 passenger numbers estimated at 300 000 on inception, increased 
to 800 000 in January 2015. This ridership shows a more than double increase in the uptake 
of passenger numbers for the Gautrain. One respondent said: 
 “The increase in passenger numbers as a result of the Gautrain infrastructure has 
managed to change public perceptions about public transport positively…It was evident in 
2012 that we were going to run out of capacity with the passenger levels we were getting…the 
project had come into its own”. 
The project was however affected by issues such as the protracted environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) process and dispute between the partners. These issues affected the project 
in terms of final costs and lack of continuity of certain role players and experts. However, the 
project was completed, and the public private partnerships has so far been sustainable. 
Contributing to this sustainability is revenue collection enabled by the automatic fare 
collection system (GMA, 2015). The automated system was designed and installed to enable 
fare adjustments and implementation of fare adjustments. 
The Gautrain Management Agency has since then proposed the development of seven 
new rapid rail routes along identified “high-mobility corridors” in Gauteng province, which 
will be promulgated under the province’s 25-year Integrated Transport Master Plan 
(ITMP25). This new development, called Gautrain 2, is 140km of additional track. According 
to the interview respondents:  
“The prefeasibility and feasibility studies have been done. We submitted to National 
Treasury in November 2017, so we’re awaiting Tier 1 approval. We are in the process of 
procuring the services of a service provider to do the preliminary route alignment study for 
phase 1. …Because of cost and complexity, the Gautrain 2 is proposed to be implemented in 
phases. Phase 1 connects Marlboro, Sandton to Randburg and then to Cosmo City…….The 
feasibility for Gautrain 2 has been concluded….we are currently engaging the National 
Treasury for Gautrain 2…we hope construction will soon be underway” 
The systems adopted in the development of the Gautrain 1 including the risk 
management, automatic fare collection system, and contract agreement will be maintained 
with Gautrain 2 and in line with technological advances. It is expected that the lessons learnt 
from Gautrain 1 will inform the proposed Gautrain 2 project. 
3.2 The Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit Project (AA-LRT)  
Construction of the estimated U$475 million AA-LRT system started on 31 March 2012. 
The construction of the AA-LRT was a response to the mounting public transport challenges 
of metropolitan Addis Ababa – city experiencing an annual growth rate estimated at 145%, 
and that is responsible for around half of the national GDP. Addis Ababa is also a city seeing 
rapid growth in its urban population which is forecasted to double by 2030 and to reach over 
10 million inhabitants by 2037.  As one of the fastest-growing metropolis on the continent, 
with an annual population growth of 3.8 percent, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) 
said the unsafe, aged public transport system increasingly failed to meet transportation 
demand and expectations of commuters and other stakeholders such as the city administration 
and the federal government. More than 10,000 traffic accidents occurred nationwide, with 
about 418 deaths resulting from traffic accidents in Addis Ababa alone (Sabatino, 2017). 
Movement of commuter mini-buses was chaotic and hazardous. Reports show that the 
transport system was increasingly perilous to life and property due to traffic congestion and 
accidents. Environmental pollution was also a concern with a high risk of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from an aged hydrocarbon-powered fleet.   ERC argued that 
given this diversity and complexity of Addis Ababa’s public transport problems, there was 
need for a creative, high impact alternative transport infrastructure approach that would take 
into account issues of capacity, cost, impact, safety, reliability, comfort, efficiency, city 
ambience, disability issues and environmental sustainability.  
Consequently, in response to the multitude of public transport issues, the Federal 
Government of Ethiopia decided to set up the AA-LRT system and entrusted the operations 
to its own company, Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) (Mohapatra, 2017). The AA-LRT 
in Addis Ababa, consisting of two lines namely the East-West (17.35KM) and North-South 
(16.9KM) making a total of 34.2KM, was designed to reach 60,000 people per day with the 
design speed of 80KM/hr. The network has 44 stations. 
 Governance  
The AA-LRT system was a turnkey project for the Addis Ababa City Administration with 
oversight of the Ministry of Transport (MOT). The federal city authorities were major players  
and municipal players, with the support of the Agence d’urbanisme de Lyon (Lyon Urban 
Planning Agency) and the World Bank in undertaking studies to identify the need for mass 
transit for Addis Ababa and assessing possible solutions including the AA-LRT  (Nallet, 
2018). Records show that the Government through its MOT appointed a steering committee 
to work with the Addis Ababa City Roads Authority (AACRA) which had already established 
the AA-LRT desk earlier to implement processes towards establishing a city passenger rail 
system in December 2007 (Jemere, 2012). The MOT further entrusted the Ethiopian Railway 
Corporation (ERC), a subsidiary state-run company founded in 2007, to develop the AA-LRT 
lines (Nallet, 2018). In March of the following year, the ERC assumed full project 
management responsibility of the AA-LRT project and immediately floated the first turnkey 
project tender. Although other bidders are not known, the successful bidder was announced 
to be China Railway Eryuan Engineering Group to construct the line. The ERC was also 
entrusted with the responsibility for operations and maintenance, a responsibility that ERC 
outsourced to Shenzhen Metro Corporation until 2020 (Nallet, 2018). 
Financing the AA-LRT was a bottleneck, and indeed delayed the start of the 
implementation. To overcome this bottleneck, Ethiopia turned to China (Tarrosy and Vӧrӧs, 
2018). The initial pre-contract negotiations were not successful due to failure to justify the 
high cost of the project and provide satisfactory cost breakdowns. The AA-LRT was quoted 
by the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) at a cost of $475 million (447 million 
euros), with 85% of this total cost financed through external debt from China's Export-Import 
Bank - a state-owned policy bank with the status of an independent legal entity. A 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) was first signed between China Railway Engineering 
Corporation (CREC) and the Government of Ethiopia.  Subsequently, ERC and CREC 
undertook joint feasibility studies in 2009, paving way for the signing of a loan agreement 
after a conceptual design had been costed. The financial conditions agreed in June 2011 
include 15% equity and 85% foreign loan; this is a debt and equity ratio 85:15. The remaining 
15% of the total cost of the AA-LRT system was financed through raising equity in the open 
market by the Ethiopian Government (Mohapatra, 2015; Mail Online, 2017).  
The current operators of the system, Shenzhen Metro Group, received the rights in December 
2014 with a contract worth $100 million for three years: starting in the first quarter of 2015 
and terminating in August 2018. The contract includes provisions regarding training of local 
personnel in order to build capacity to take over the management of the system during the 
operational stage after August 2018 (Sabatino, 2017; Tarrosy and Vӧrӧs, 2018). The contract 
also includes the operation and maintenance of the lines. These conditions imply that the 
Chinese company, Shenzhen Metro Group, receives the income from ticket purchases 
(Tarrosy and Vӧrӧs, ibid.). Lack of transparency characterized the negotiations with the 
Chinese actors, and indeed until at the very end, the source of finance for the project was kept 
a secret.  
A turnkey model was adopted to deliver the project by which the Chinese company 
became responsible for all the Engineering, procurement and construction tasks.  The choice 
of this delivery method is not alien to the lack of local skilled labor in Ethiopia, the preferences 
of the lenders, the high investment cost, and the sense of urgency. By delegating all critical 
project phases to a Chinese firm, a structure was created that enabled the Chinese contractor 
to build the project at its projected cost to the agreed standard, and within the estimated time. 
The project started in November 2015, whereas it was expected to start in early 2016 (Grey, 
2016; World Folio, 2016). These facts do not tell much about efficiency, however, because 
of the lack of transparency over the negotiation process, it makes it unclear whether the cost 
and schedule targets were reasonable or highly conservative when they were set up upfront 
by the two parties behind closed doors. By opening earlier than expected, the railway enabled 
other benefits by for example delivering essential food aid to the drought-stricken areas in 
Addis Ababa (Grey, 2016). 
Overall, the AA-LRT project rode on the strength of the political will and commitment 
of the federal government of Ethiopia. The state commitment was visible through initiatives 
geared towards responsiveness to service delivery and reduce bureaucratic red tape (Nallet, 
2018). Notwithstanding the political support and local authority commitment, the state claims 
that it approved a bankable project based on feasibility study, environmental and social impact 
assessment to eliminate the risk of failure. The state also claims that the project was approved 
because it was commercially sustainable and yet capable to offer an affordable service 
(Jemere, 2012).  
Still, the AA-LRT was not part of the initial Master plan for the city (Nallet, 2018). It is 
unclear the extent to which the design was later aligned to the Addis Ababa master plan. But 
there is evidence that there were complaints that the project planners did not properly integrate 
the AA-LRT with existing transport systems (Tarrosy and Vӧrӧs, 2018). Indeed, a recent 
detailed study of the system notes that the railway line is totally disconnected from the city’s 
coordination programme. As one respondent interviewed in that study said:  
“We have the issues of integration. We want to make integration in the future. We are 
planning to make an agreement with minibuses. Now we know that there is no harmony and 
that we have to organize an infrastructure for integration….We don’t have direct relations 
with the other transport agencies but we are planning to coordinate the transport in the city. 
For now, we don’t cooperate” (Nallet, 2018).   
 Delivery  
Any large-scale infrastructure project can be expected to encounter a multiplicity of 
challenges during delivery, and this is true for AA-LRT too.   Perhaps the most daunting issue 
was the land and property costs. The line was to be constructed in an area already built-up 
and compensation payments for land acquired for the project were as unavoidable as 
dissatisfaction with compensation amounts and procedures. The AA-LRT had to deal with 
heritage issues as it had to pass through areas that, reflected the history and cultural heritage, 
not only of Addis Ababa metropolis but also Ethiopia at large. For example, the line had to 
pass through Adwa Square and St Abune Paulos Square which had the statues of Emperor 
Menelik II and St Abune Paulos, former archbishop of the Ethiopian Christian Orthodox 
Church erected in 1941. The authorities had to assure the public that the statues and what they 
stood for would not be defiled.  A committee was then set up to: 
 “oversee the removal and subsequent reinstatement of the statue, comprising the city’s 
Culture and Tourism Bureau, the Research and Conservation of Cultural Heritage Authority, 
Addis Ababa City Roads Authority and ERC”  
The project was also affected by a dearth of local skilled manpower. However, the 
authorities realized that the dearth of skills could be used as a catalyst to develop the necessary 
capabilities in the future; the general manager of ERC, said;  
“In order to build the future skilled human capacity of the Corporation, curriculum has 
been developed in the academic institutions and is designed to be implemented with intensive 
training”  
Furthermore, project reports show that industrial capacity for both downstream and 
upstream activities had to be re-geared upwards through retooling and re-skilling of local 
enterprises sub-contracted in the construction processes. However, the upskilling of local 
enterprises came at a cost, approximately U$3 million per kilometre). And Although the 
project is estimated to have employed around 4500 local workers who are supposed to have 
benefited from knowledge and skills transfer, evidence suggests that in some grades the 
training and skills transfer that was expected to happen did not actually happen although the 
contract indicated that for each discipline in the contract there had to be skills capacity 
building for local personnel. According to the AA-LRT project manager, Mr Bahailu 
Sintayehu;  
“For each and every discipline in the contract, there is a clause that enforces (sic) the 
contractor to arrange capacity building program training” (www.equaltimes.org).   
The partial non-compliance to the contract terms on skills development, coupled with short 
term contracts which were prevalent on the project highlights the issues of fair labor practices 
in megaprojects involving foreign contractors. Other negative aspects that have been pointed 
to the new railway system relate to poor integration with the existing transport network. This 
is arguably due to the centralized structure that was adopted to govern the project which did 
not encourage cooperation with other critical stakeholders. For example, there are claims that 
the system was not effectively designed resulting in situations where for instance at grade 
separation (above ground and underground) traffic congestion is far less than at grade level 
intersections such as the traffic circle at Beshale Hotel. Consequently, a major safety issue 
exists. The solution could have been to grade-separate those intersections which do not have 
grade separation to minimize the conflict between street and rail traffic. Other observers have 
noted the poor integration between AA-LRT and rapid bus transit (RBT) systems and other 
alternative city transport systems. According to Endeshaw (2013), there is also no parking 
strategy hence there is no dedicated parking at AA-LRT stations and there is no free parking 
provided near AA-LRT stations. This has created a safety risk as motorists and contract taxis 
have taken over the outer lanes of the roads running adjacent the railway line. And one other 
critique has been made regarding the ticket kiosks which are located far from the stations 
while the public toilets are non-existent for commuters. 
 Performance 
For the state, the Addis Ababa AA-LRT is performing well. According to the AA-LRT 
spokesperson (2017, Online), the train service has already carried more than 50 million 
passengers and made a positive impact on Addis Ababa. The goal was to alleviate shortage 
of transport for the lower income people and according to some residents of Addis Ababa, 
this goal has been met to an extent (News24, 2017 online). During the Ethiopian Fiscal Year 
2016/17, the state-owned ERC earned $5 million in revenue from the AA-LRT under the 
management of the Chinese firm Shenzhen Metro Group Company. The money has been 
earned through fare collection from an estimated 35 million passengers during the 2017/2018 
fiscal year (Xinhua, 2017). The project has an estimated daily income of about 400,000 Birr 
($14,000) (Tarrosy and Vӧrӧs, 2018). Reports are that the project, which currently transports 
about 60,000 people daily, has recorded good performance in many other areas such as travel 
time and congestion reduction. Operational records and news outlets indicate that there is a 
significant reduction in journey time (by two-thirds for those travelling from the periphery of 
the city) as well as traffic congestion in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, home to around 
four million residents (Xinhua, 2017). There is also an improved average transport speed from 
10km/hr (by road travel) to 22km/hr (by AA-LRT) (C40 Cities, 2018).  
Additionally, the project is reported as having created 13,000 jobs during construction. 
At its construction peak, the AA-LRT project employed over 4500 workers and trained more 
than 200 local engineers and technicians in China; and during the 2016/17 period, the railway 
system employed over 1,100 people (Xinhua, 2017; C40 Cities, 2018). Further, other 
observers claim that the AA-LRT project has yielded other benefits including improved 
quality of life, improved transport options for most citizens including the disabled and elderly, 
improved access to health care facilities, technology and skills transfer as well as better 
business performance of nearby firms (Negrew et al., 2013; Sabatino, 2017; C40 Cities, 
2018).  
But not everyone sees the AA-LRT so successful. For some Addis Ababa residents, the 
road traffic congestion is still the same and roads remain overcrowded by minibus taxis. The 
lack of integration of the tram system with the other public transport system namely the 
preexisting bus system is frequently noted as a weakness of the project. As a result, commuters 
have to walk long distances to get to the stations and cross streets cluttered with vehicles in 
order to walk between the trams stations and the bus stations.  
Criticism notwithstanding, the trains are frequently overcrowded. Such is the demand for 
the system particularly from low income people - “It’s better than nothing” is the most 
frequent quote as often read in articles on the main press about the system (Nazret, 2017). 
Experts have also lauded the system’s low pollution levels with regard to reduction in 
emissions and gases. Although full emission reduction data are not available, cumulative 
emission reduction potential of the system is projected to be 1.8 million tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2e) by 2030 (C40 Cities, 2018).  In terms of environmental sustainability, the 
AA-LRT system is rated to be environmentally friendly and thus sustainable because it is 
powered by low-carbon electricity from geothermal, hydropower and wind, in addition to the 
Ethiopian electric grid (Sabatino, 2017). Infrastructure-based adaptation measures that 
consider the performance of the system, incorporated into its design, systems such as above-
grade long bridges and spatial drainage systems which some argue resulted in spatially 
effective and accessible facility (Aklilu and Necha, 2018; C40 Cities, 2018). 
All in all, it seems fair to say that the AA-LRT system has provided more transport modes 
and generally helped to improve the economic growth of the Addis Ababa city and the 
Ethiopian economy as a whole. The impact of the system was argued for in an Ethiopian 
Business Review Report who contend that: “there are not enough roads for the cars coming 
into the Country particularly in Addis Ababa” (Mekonnen, 2014).   The project is also praised 
for changing the landscape of the city and elevating Addis Ababa to becoming an international 
city (Nallet, 2018). Still, the rapid increase in Ethiopia’s population and the country’s 
economic growth (one of the highest on the continent exceeding 10% at times), means more 
transportation infrastructure will be needed urgently. The AA-LRT already cannot meet the 
demand as during most of the operational period, the trains are reported to be full. Still,  if we 
accept that  a main criteria for assessing the performance of infrastructure is the extent it is 
serving a wider population , it is fair to say that The AA-LRT is creating value. Its expansion 
to cover other parts of the city will further create more opportunities for broader value 
creation.  This is beside the business opportunities (upstream and downstream) that are likely 
to evolve around the provision of value chain services to the AA-LRT system in general and 
the railway system (5 000km) at large. 
4.0 DISCUSSION 
Based on the two case studies we argue that large infrastructure procurement and 
governance in Africa is not a one size fits all organizational solution, but rather illustrative of 
varying organizational paths that governments can choose to deliver infrastructure. We turn 
now to discuss how the organization adopted for each project was able to deal with critical 
factors that may impact on project delivery and the so-called bottlenecks.  
4.1 Interdependence of the project and the institutional environment  
In Ethiopia, despite the decentralized political system, the federal government has control 
over the organization and management of infrastructural projects. The government dictates 
how the nation’s development goals and objectives should be realized (Nallet, 2018). It was 
therefore not surprising given the political environment, that the state drove the 
implementation of the AA-LRT. Accordingly, for the Ethiopian case, the traditional route of 
public procurement was chosen to deliver the project. Through bilateral agreements, the 
Federal Republic of Ethiopia borrowed from China and thereafter appointed a Chinese 
contractor as an EPC contractor. But against norms of transparency, accountability and good 
governance, there was no competitive bidding process. Rather, the contracts between the state 
and the Chinese state-owned firms were forged behind closed doors. This secrecy however, 
created an institutional environment that enabled the project to move very rapidly from 
planning through implementation. The period between project concept and signing of contract 
with the contractor was four years. In contrast, the period it took the Gautrain was almost 
twice that of AA-LRT at seven years between concept and concession agreement. 
The PPP underlying Gautrain project suggests an approach to organizing much more in 
line with recommendations from western development aid agencies such as the World Bank. 
This was also a much slower project to get off the ground due to institutional pressures for 
accountability and transparency. But South Africa is also not Ethiopia. South Africa can raise 
finance for its infrastructure projects from many sources. South Africa is also an established 
democracy with numerous institutional checks and balances scrutinizing major public 
investment decisions. Hence, the procurement process in the Gautrain project had to be 
approved by the central government even though it was not a state project. The PPP had also 
to be registered with the treasury department for approval. In additional, the premier of 
Gauteng was asked to appear before the national parliamentary committee to give clarity on 
the project. The province’s management agency, GMA, also had to appear before the national 
parliamentary portfolio committee on transportation to satisfy the state on the feasibility of 
the project as well as the socio-economic impact of the project. 
4.2  The Design of Project Governance  
In a project context, governance is broadly about the structures and the processes, that 
need to be put in place to manage interrelations and support decision-making between the 
project actors, and between the project and the environment, . For the Gautrain project, the 
central government was the regulator and financial contributor of 44.2% to the development 
cost. Although the central government had no direct control on the project, their commitment 
by way of funding meant that the project nonetheless was a national asset and supportive of 
the government’s national development plans. Consequently, the project through the 
involvement of the state gained the necessary political legitimacy that could otherwise cause 
the collapse of the project organization (Han et al., 2009).  
The state’s involvement as a financier meant nonetheless that the Gautrain project was 
intensely scrutinized by the public and the media. Such scrutiny and criticism is expected in 
a democratic state such as South Africa and consequently, the publics’ voice cannot be 
ignored. To this purpose, the Gauteng Province developed strategies and through the office 
of the premier addressed many of the public’s concerns ranging from ridership estimates, cost 
to the South African Government’s fiscus, lack of direct and detailed oversight by the central 
government, impact on land use planning and questions around public-buy-in. The local 
provincial government was resolute in its intent and had the capacity to follow through with 
its decisions – an approach in line with United Nations recommendations that local 
governments should initiate and implement projects for local service delivery infrastructure 
(United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), 2018). This approach to governance 
was possible, however, because in South Africa, the regulatory framework allows for local 
authorities with capability to initiate and develop capital-intensive projects. Indeed, it is a 
constitutional mandate of the republic of South Africa for local authorities to provide local 
service delivery infrastructure.   
As the owner of the Gautrain project, the provincial government appointed the Province 
Support Team (PST) to manage the design, feasibility and planning process before the 
concession agreement was signed. The PST was also retained during the development stage 
as contract managers. At the construction stage, the PST assumed the responsibility of 
managing the design and construction review process as well as the construction, legal and 
environmental compliance processes. The complexity of the project entailed that capacity not 
available in the provincial government, had to be imported and assigned to the project. The 
province’s approach in organizing is congruent with the idea that demands from the technical 
tasks will imply the development of structures and processes to coordinate the activities 
(World Bank, 2015).  
The provincial government also appointed the management agency (GMA) to oversee 
and manage the project during the operational period and beyond. The appointments of the 
GMA, the private partner (Bombela) and the PST were made by the Gauteng provincial 
government, and we found no evidence that they were influenced by the central government.  
Indeed, the constitutional environment in South Africa made it difficult for the central 
government to influence local choice.  The strength of the polycentric governance in South 
Africa can be seen in the refusal by the then premier of Gauteng Mr Shilowa to comply with 
the national parliamentary transport portfolio committee which suggested that the province 
drop the idea of building a new train and but rather upgrade the existing metro rail instead.  
In marked contrast, there was limited engagement between the project organization and 
the stakeholder environment in the AA-LRT case. Instead, our findings suggest that the 
development of the light rail project, was centralized, planned and designed, and presented as 
a showcase project of the government for its Ethiopian renewal agenda (Nallet, 2018). Whilst 
this was an urban project, we found limited direct influence in decision-making of the local 
authorities which is against policy advice that the central government’s role should be 
restricted to formulation and auditing of public interest objectives (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003). 
 Rather, in the Ethiopian case, the federal government exhibited domineering tendency even 
though, there is a political decentralization process in Ethiopia. But de facto the federal 
government bulldozed its way to implement the AA-LRT project.  According to Nallet (2018), 
although Addis Ababa was previous responsible for transport planning, the central 
government decided to drive the AA-LRT and appointed the Ethiopian railway corporation 
to manage it. A downside of this centralized approach to local infrastructure development is 
that local project selection becomes a central government’s responsibility despite lacking 
knowledge of the local needs.  This creates risks to local infrastructure, in that the 
infrastructure most needed by the local community is usually overlooked in favor of projects 
that align more with the central government’s agenda. Yet, in our case, the evidence does not 
suggest that the AA-LRT did not meet local needs. However, the centralized approach got in 
the way of good integration of the railway route with the local transportation systems and the 
city masterplan, and thus opportunities for greater valuer creation were missed. Yet, despite 
the Ethiopian government’s centralised approach to the delivery of the AA-LRT, the AA-LRT 
project gained legitimacy because it responded to the legitimate demands of citizens for better 
efficient and reliable public transport in Addis Ababa. The fact the system is running 
frequently overcrowded with low income people evinces its success in addressing a major 
transportation gap. 
From the perspective of western lenders and acceptable norms, of course this approach 
trumps good governance for the sake of getting things built quickly. Land acquisition is a 
delicate issue in light of democratic values of individual freedom, democracy, and property 
rights.  It is true that the government instituted compensation programmes for land acquired 
and property that had to be demolished to make way for the AA-LRT system. But Without a 
doubt, there were many pockets of discontent given that the line had to pass through areas 
that were already built-up. Yet we cannot ignore when discussing this issue that unlike many 
other African states, in Ethiopia, all land belongs to the state and land owners are only deemed 
leaseholders, even if they have been living there for generations. Thus the government had 
regulation on its side when it mobilised imminent domain laws to acquire the land. Clearly, 
the railway as any large-scale infrastructure project left some landowners worse off even 
though the government set up a compensation regime.  But that is true for the Ethiopian case 
as it is for any major infrastructure. Intriguingly, an internet search did not reveal any major 
headlines about land disputes regarding the construction for the AA-LRT tram. As one 
respondent to the study said: 
“Research on land issue in Ethiopia is highly political” 
There is marked contrast with the many headlines related to the violent protests against 
the government’s plans to integrate Addis Ababa with the surrounding towns in Oromia, home 
to the Oromo ethnic group, which for some observers violated Ethiopia’s ethno-regional 
federalism, a manifest of abuse of power by the ethnic group over the rival Oromo ethnic 
group. 
Land disputes notwithstanding, AA-LRT is a powerful symbol of the federal 
government’s centralized approach to development (Nallet, 2018). However, such an 
approach could never have worked in South Africa, a democratic state, where a centralized 
approach would create a risk of rejection and lack of public-buy-in. This was what happened 
for example in Gauteng, South Africa where an electronic road tolling project was rejected 
and suffered loss because the project was spearheaded by the central government with limited 
local stakeholder engagement (Naidoo, 2013). In Ethiopia, however, an authoritarian state, 
the local actors have limited capacity to voice their opposition to initiatives from the central 
government. There is also limited visibility about how much opposition there is on the ground 
because information flows are restricted and there is no freedom of information. Yet, the AA-
LRT project, whilst promoted by a central government, met a real local need.  
4.3 Funding and procurement methods 
 There is agreement that African states lack resources to address the large infrastructure 
gap that they are facing (Estache et al., 2015). Accordingly, Williams and Samset (2010) 
argue that the central government’s role in infrastructure should be restricted to formulation 
and auditing of public interest objectives. Apart from oversight, central government’s role as 
supporters of projects is also critical (Allport et al., 2008). The PPP model adopted by Gauteng 
Provincial government, involving private sector financing, internally, generating funds, 
borrowing, and public funding, was thus very much aligned with the ideas advanced by 
western agencies to overcome the financial bottleneck to bridge Africa’s infrastructure gap.  
The funding structure then influenced the procurement method. The PPP method for the 
Gautrain and access to local funding mechanisms was possible because of the local finance 
capacity and a demonstration of the business case to the financiers.  
The Ethiopian case tells a different story on financing. The Ethiopian state opted for 
borrowing to finance the project through bilateral agreements and use of public funds. 
Specifically, the AA-LRT was funded by the central government through a foreign loan 
amounting to 85% of the total development cost. This loan was tied to the appointment of 
foreign contractors. The procurement and organizational approach adopted by the Ethiopian 
Government meant that the lack of local capabilities was circumvented, and thus enable to 
get things done quickly. Turning to foreign contractors selected without a competitive process 
in place would be a practice wholly unacceptable in South Africa, a state where political 
pluralism allows for a much greater level of activism by the civil society. But Ethiopia is a 
different context. The speed by which Ethiopia managed to get the railway built suggests an 
alternative way to develop infrastructure available to cash-strapped states with difficulties to 
borrow on the capital markets. Chinese actors offered an alternative to the Breton Woods 
institutions.  The funding perspective of “look-east” policy seems to be working in Ethiopia. 
5.0 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Our Findings suggest that both projects achieved the criteria of effectiveness, and 
sustainability despite using different procurement and organizational approaches. A 
competitive market suggests Gautrain was an efficient scheme. Lack of data about the AA-
LRT tram makes it hard to tell whether the project was cost efficient or not. We will never 
know. What we know, however, is that underlying both approaches, was a strong political 
commitment to the developments, which enabled the projects to withstand bottlenecks that 
could otherwise have stalled delivery. Furthermore, in both cases, the project promoters never 
rushed to construction before settling the funding and finance aspect. This is in agreement 
with Allport et al. (2008) who warns that where decisions to procure are made too early and 
not based on robust viability assessment, serious problems can emerge later on that can cause 
the project to unravel.  
One limitation of our study is the lack of detailed data on how both project organizations 
went about to acquire the much-needed land. Land acquisition on both projects was just as 
complex and in need of proper management as the rail projects themselves. For the Gautrain, 
land acquisition was a task assigned to the provincial government. This task was regulated by 
established laws on land use rights and payment of fair compensation. We know that well 
over 1100 properties were directly affected by the Gautrain (Andrews and Thoms, 2012). But 
more work is required to understand how exactly the eminent domain law were employed and 
how contestation and opposition were handled. For sure, it seems that the local government 
was the organization in a better placed to deal with the land acquisition problems as they are 
familiar with the local communities. We know much less about how land was acquired in the 
case of the Ethiopian project. It is reasonable to assume that the state leverages its 
constitutional rights as the ultimate land owner to force evictions but would not be surprising 
to find that the state may have resorted to more forceful forms of action to evict people. This 
important issue merits further investigation.  
Related to this, is the engagement of the project organizational framework with the 
environment which calls for more investigation. Our evidence suggests different levels of 
stakeholder engagement across the two cases. We know in general that strong public 
resistance can complicate project delivery and ultimately undermine the success of the project 
outcome especially if there is no political legitimacy (Han et al., 2009; Brautigam et al, 2010). 
Of course, for the AA-LRT, strong commitment from the central government ensured that the 
project was delivered on its objectives. The project was also meeting a major gap in public 
transportation in a growing city, and thus it was unlikely the tram would become a white 
elephant. Yet, in as much as the centralized approach was adopted, we still observed efforts 
from the government to gain buy-in from the public. For example, the state invested in a 
training component by setting up an institute of technology. This suggests that centralization 
and stakeholder engagement are not mutually exclusive. Unsurprisingly, for the Gautrain, we 
found even more efforts to engage with stakeholders to achieve public buy-in.  The project 
coalition set up a stakeholder relationship and a communication structure with the GMA and 
used regular media releases to update and interact with all affected communities, public 
relevant authorities and affected third parties. The effectiveness of these efforts merits further 
investigation. 
6.0 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter we argue that there is no one-size fits all organizational solution to develop 
mega-infrastructure projects in developing countries. We ground our argument on two 
railways projects, one in South Africa, a democratic state, and another in Ethiopia, an 
authoritarian state. In both cases we find that the adopted procurement process and 
organization structure were directly influenced by the external environment. In both cases, 
the evidence so far suggests the developments succeeded to produce public goods that are 
sources of broad value creation. The speed by which the Addis Abba railway was constructed, 
within three years,  is particularly remarkable, and meets the grand challenge facing Addis 
Abba – a fast growing city predicted to reach a 10 million population in 20 years’ time. Whilst 
much slower to get off the ground, the Gautrain too was delivered on time, and succeeded to 
serve the urgent needs for transportation during the FIFA 2010 world cup. Since their 
openings, in both cases, demand has been growing exponentially for the new transport 
infrastructures. This suggests that the outcomes are tackling a real problem on the ground and 
have potential to be engines of sustainable economic growth and better quality of life. 
These empirical findings are important. The African continent has set goals to improve 
or develop urban centers. Infrastructure has been identified to play a key role in catalyzing 
urban development. Particularly, transport and telecommunication infrastructure have a 
central role in human development. Yet, the African states are not alike. Different states are 
at different stages of development and have chosen to follow different paths in terms of the 
way the society is organized politically. Some states have chosen to follow the path of political 
pluralism and democracy. Others have opted for autocratic regimes. It is not our job here to 
discuss if one regime is superior to the other. A complex discussion is made even more 
complex as western democracies are hobbled by fiscal pressures and populism. Rather, our 
purpose here has been to show that different institutional environments can be leveraged to 
enable different forms of mega-project organizing and governance. Our finding shows that 
there is not a single organizational solution to deliver large-scale infrastructure in Africa. 
Rather, we see a duality of solutions rooted in different sets of institutional strengths. 
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